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The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security 
Abstract 
Climate change is one of the greatest challenges and most pressing issues faced by 
humanity in the modern era. Extreme weather events, changes to world ecosystems, 
species extinction, disruption of animal and human migration, resource shortages, socio-
economic concerns, outbreaks and pandemics, as well as domestic and international 
conflicts represent only a few select potential climate change consequences. Regrettably, 
when considering the issues pertinent to climate change, one of the oft-overlooked areas is 
cultural security. Rising sea levels will lead to some of the world’s islands and coastal cities 
essentially being erased from Earth, resulting in the destruction, and possibly even the 
disappearance, of their cultural heritage. Inhabitants of endangered and unlivable areas 
are likely to drive mass exodus on a global scale, and forcibly displaced persons who find 
themselves in a new socio-cultural reality face countless challenges that will hinder their 
sense of cultural security. The most immediate concerns are related to the potential 
eruption of local and regional conflicts, emergence of negative social behaviors, 
disappearance of national language and cultural identity, and statelessness due to a loss of 
habitable lands, all of which pose severe threats to cultural security. 
This article is available in Journal of Strategic Security: https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/
iss4/2 
1 
Introduction 
 
Climate change is one of the most pressing issues facing humanity in the 
21st century and it has already led to devastating environmental 
consequences globally.1 Scientific evidence of climate change includes 
increasing global temperature, rising sea levels, extreme weather events, 
and ocean acidification, amongst many others.2 These negative 
environmental outcomes have significant downstream effects on many 
aspects of human life, which if not addressed, will ultimately lead to a loss 
of security. Consequently, there are numerous publications, which explore 
the relationship between climate change and human security. Many 
content experts highlight that climate change, as it continues to worsen, 
will progressively threaten human security by endangering cultures and 
identities, negatively affecting the economy, and increasing forced 
migration. 3 Some publications choose to focus on the environmental 
consequences of climate change, drawing attention to the resultant 
environmental degradation or the extreme weather events increasing in 
both frequency and severity.4 Other studies take this one-step further into 
the security arena and investigate the correlation between climate change 
and violent conflicts, recognizing climate change as an exacerbating factor 
in these conflicts.5 On the other hand, some take a different approach and 
link climate change and its affects to broader areas of security, such as 
national security and security policy development, or the direct and 
indirect socio-economic consequences.6 However, only a handful of 
available resources examine climate change from the cultural perspective, 
but these largely ignore cultural security and focus mainly on sociocultural 
issues, such as societal resilience, or the protection of tangible cultural 
heritage. There is a notable insufficiency in the published research and 
literature regarding cultural security, and consequently, the authors set 
out to fill this gap in the literature by exploring the potential impacts of 
climate change within the cultural security framework.  
 
Cultural security refers to a protection of broadly defined culture, 
including tangible cultural heritage (for example, cultural sites, objects, 
and artwork) and non-tangible cultural legacy (for example, cultural 
values, identity, language, religion).7 Importantly, cultural security 
concerns cultural rights and freedoms, and relates to the protection of 
cultural, ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities.8 Plausible downstream 
consequences of climate change constitute a direct threat to cultural 
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heritage and individuals, and therefore, their cultural security. Due to 
rising sea levels, many low-lying states are in danger of complete 
submersion. 9 In addition to the disappearance of these habitable lands, 
both cultural sites and local populations, particularly indigenous 
communities, are at risk as well. Additionally, certain regions may become 
uninhabitable and contribute to the forced migration of individuals, and 
concurrently, their cultures.10 This mass exodus of climate refugees will 
lead to new and unplanned cross-cultural encounters, which can have 
positive or negative consequences for both the incoming and domestic 
cultural groups.11 Furthermore, unlivable lands and a resource scarcity due 
to climate change may become a driving factor for regional instability, 
terrorist activity, and outbreaks of conflict.12 Therefore, climate change 
and its environmental consequences are a critical consideration for the 
cultural security agenda. To address this deficiency gap, this article aims to 
examine the correlation between climate change and cultural security by 
exploring potential threats and describing the cultural consequences of 
climate change’s impact.  
 
Overview of Climate Change 
 
Throughout its 4.5 billion year history, planet Earth has experienced 
fluctuations between ice-age cycles alternating with warmer interglacial 
periods, during which, the average global temperature and levels of 
atmospheric carbon dioxide, methane, and other heat-trapping 
greenhouse gases have varied greatly.13 Life began to evolve along with the 
planet approximately 800 million years after its formation, which 
ultimately led to the evolution of the first Hominids around 4.4 million 
years ago.14 Several million years later, about 70,000 years ago, 
descendants of these early Hominids known as Homo sapiens, began to 
leave Africa and spread throughout the rest of the world. Similar to all 
other mammalian lifeforms, they maintained a minimal and local effect on 
plant and animal life, with no impact on the global environment or 
climate.15 This changed, however, beginning in the late 18th century, when 
the Industrial Revolution ushered in a new era of widespread automation 
and the use of machinery, often powered with the burning of fossil fuels. 
Consequently, it led to a global rise in atmospheric carbon dioxide and 
other heat-trapping greenhouse gases. This global rise in atmospheric 
greenhouse gases has since continued to intensify. Related climate 
research accumulated over the past several decades has made it clear that 
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human activity and industrialization contribute significantly to global 
climate change, as well as the related ongoing mass extinction of plant and 
animal species.16  
 
Despite this knowledge, however, global greenhouse gas emissions 
continue to increase, and the long-term outlook is concerning. According 
to content experts from the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 
it is highly likely that human activity will be the dominant factor 
contributing to climate change in the 21st century.17 There is already a 
growing body of evidence supporting this projection. In the modern era of 
rapid technological advancement and increasing urbanization, greenhouse 
gas emissions, particularly carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide, 
have increased significantly due to human activity, which subsequently 
contributes to global warming.18  
 
One of the observable indicators of this change is an accelerating increase 
of the average global temperature. The annual global average temperature 
has increased approximately 1.1 degrees Celsius since the beginning of the 
20th century, and recent projections predict an increase to 3.2 degrees 
Celsius above pre-industrial levels by the year 2100. Since climate record 
keeping began in 1850, the five-year period of 2015-2019 has been the 
warmest such period in history and the year 2016 was the hottest year on 
record.19 Consequently, increasing global temperature results in sea level 
rise, warming of land and ocean surfaces, shrinking glacial covers and ice 
sheets, melting sea ice in the Arctic and Antarctic, and shifting of the 
seasons.  
 
Over the last several decades, the global sea level increase has been 
accelerating rapidly, reaching its highest peak during the most recent 
measurement in 2018.20 In addition, a study done at Oxford University 
found that oceanic waters have absorbed more than 90 percent of heat 
gained by the planet between 1971-2010 and average ocean temperatures 
have risen by approximately 0.25 degrees Celsius throughout this same 
period.21 Moreover, the largest glaciers in the world continue to retreat 
rapidly, as areas such as Greenland and Antarctica, lose billions of tons of 
ice each year.22 In many locations around the world, changes to season 
cycles are observable. Winters are shorter with less sub-freezing days, the 
spring season arrives earlier, and summer periods are increasingly hotter, 
all of which can adversely affect agricultural and environmental cycles, 
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including local vegetation, animals, and crops.23 Another visible effect of 
global climate change is pertinent to the increasing frequency and 
occurrence of extreme weather events, such as severe hurricanes and 
cyclones, violent tornadoes, and intense tropical storms, which cause 
significant impacts worldwide.24  
 
Finally, one other measurable indicator of climate change relates to ocean 
acidification as the result of rising carbon dioxide emissions and 
absorption by the ocean. Some reports show that the acidification level of 
ocean waters has increased by approximately 30 percent since the start of 
the Industrial Revolution.25 Worsening climate change and global 
warming can lead to the appearance of natural disasters, which may 
include prolonged drought episodes, severe floods, increasingly aggressive 
wildfires, and dangerous tsunamis. For example, the early 21st century has 
been one of the most severe long-term drought periods in the history of 
the United States.26 Dry weather, persistent heat, and drought were major 
contributing factors to the Amazon rainforest fires, deadly wildfires in 
California, and the Australian bushfires of 2019.27 Concurrently, rising sea 
levels secondary to climate change may lead to more destruction when 
events such as tsunamis or inland floods inevitably occur. Furthermore, 
approximately 44 percent of the world population lives within 93 miles of 
the coast. As a consequence, some of the world’s coastal cities, nations, 
and islands (for example, Venice, the Netherlands, the Maldives) are at 
high risk of becoming submerged under water if climate change continues 
to accelerate as the same rate.28 
 
Consequently, these severe weather conditions can have an impact on food 
and water security, as well as other resource availability and accessibility. 
Drought or flood can considerably affect agricultural lands and field crops, 
resulting in a shortage of drinkable water and food, leading to 
malnutrition and even famine. Persistent hunger and deepening poverty, 
along with other geographical changes, can lead to the spread of infectious 
diseases, as well as outbreaks of epidemics and potentially even 
pandemics, under certain conditions.29 Simultaneously, climate change 
may lead to the reduction of global resources, resulting in local and 
regional conflicts. A study published in 2019 found an estimated 3-20 
percent increase in armed conflict risk over the previous century due to 
climate change and scientists expect this number to increase dramatically 
in coming years.30  
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In addition to the submerging of entire regions caused by rising sea levels, 
another reason for the expansion of uninhabitable areas across the world 
could be due to the rise of the average temperature. Wet bulb temperature 
(TW) measurements, which combine both heat and humidity to provide a 
threshold above which a healthy human body is unable to cool itself by 
sweating (>35 degrees Celsius), have already reached critical levels in 
several regions by 2020. This indicates that some aspects of global 
warming may be more advanced than originally feared, since climate 
change models did not predict that TW would reach this threshold prior to 
the mid-21st century.31  
 
Because of both rising sea levels and increased temperatures, a loss of 
habitable lands may result in endangerment or extinction of plant and 
animal species, and further lead to both human and animal mass 
migrations. This evacuation of endangered populations and a need for 
global relocation may also contribute to the increased risk of international 
conflict over remaining habitable regions.32 To conclude, climate change 
and global warming have a significant impact on the planet’s ecosystems 
and have the potential to affect the global security landscape increasingly 
through both sociocultural and political transformation, as well as major 
geographical and demographic changes. 
 
Cultural Security 
 
The relationship between culture and security has existed for millennia 
and the history of humankind demonstrates numerous consequences of 
cultural encounters. The development of culture and intergenerational 
transmission of its values contributed to the building of nations and entire 
civilizations.33 Conversely, conflicts that bred from inter-cultural 
differences have repeatedly led to negative outcomes, including amongst 
many  
 
• Insurgency (for example, Boko Haram activity in Nigeria);  
• Social and national movements (for example, Arab Spring);  
• Local and international conflicts (for example, Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict);  
• Military involvement and the outbreak of wars (for example, 
Bosnian-Serbian War).34  
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Despite the fact that this interplay between culture and security occurred 
throughout most of recorded human history, the term cultural security has 
only begun to appear in literature relatively recently.35 However, there is 
no consensus amongst security scholars regarding how to define and 
classify cultural security. Many contemporary security theorists regard 
cultural security as a type of security, alongside economic, environmental, 
ideological, information, military, political, and societal.36 Other security 
experts emphasize the people-centered focus of cultural security, whether 
on an individual or collective level, and thus, consider cultural security to 
be a dimension of human security.37 Another group of scholars regards 
cultural security as a component of the global competition for soft power.38  
 
Most security specialists agree, however, regardless of their ontological 
classification, that cultural security is pertinent to non-traditional security, 
as opposed to traditional, state-centered security, which relates more 
directly to military and economic power.39 The lack of academic consensus 
and paucity of relevant literature highlights that cultural security is a 
neglected concept and emphasizes the importance of further examination, 
especially as it relates to rapidly evolving existential threat of climate 
change.  
 
Cultural security is a multidimensional concept and the perceptions of 
cultural security differ across the world, as each state possesses its own set 
of characteristics, environments, and unique historical experiences. In 
addition, the definitions of cultural security vary depending on what 
particular aspect a content expert chooses to emphasize. Many definitions 
highlight the individual and collective dimensions of cultural security, 
particularly the concept of identity.40  
 
In Ukraine, for example, cultural security strongly correlates with the 
protection of cultural, national, and political identity from external 
influences. Therefore, cultural security integrates with information 
security and relates to a set of political and normative actions to protect 
Ukrainian culture and identity.41 Similarly, cultural identity plays a vital 
role in indigenous communities. Cultural, intellectual, and spiritual 
creations, known as Traditional Knowledge (TK) and Traditional Cultural 
Expressions (TCEs), are not only reflections of indigenous cultural 
heritage, but also crucial components of their community identity.42 
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Therefore, the cultural security of indigenous populations refers to the 
protection of TK and TCEs. These identity-related definitions also extend 
to the protection of human and cultural rights, as well as one’s 
sociocultural identity, which are the integral parts of human security.43  
 
One example that reflects this approach to cultural security links to a 
situation experienced in various regions of Africa. Many African nations 
are facing numerous challenges, including food and water insecurity, 
persistent poverty, outbreaks of epidemics, increased terrorist activity, and 
the eruption of conflicts and civil wars, mainly due to scarcity of natural 
resources.44 These severe events not only endanger local people’s 
livelihoods, but also affect their cultures, cultural identities, and diversity, 
making them prone and vulnerable to external influences and hindering 
their cultural continuity.45 Consequently, cultural security closely 
correlates with human security and the protection of local populations and 
their cultures. 
 
A separate, but overlapping, group of definitions extends the concept of 
cultural security to the state level and associate cultural security with 
national security. In this context, cultural security refers to state’s ability to 
protect its cultural, and by extension, national heritage.46 Furthermore, 
cultural security refers to an environment in which a society can freely 
cultivate the values shaping its cultural, hence, national identity, while at 
the same time remaining open to the experiences, influences, and cultural 
achievements of other nations. In other words, it is the environment of 
cultural equilibrium, which allows the freedom to cherish one’s own 
culture and experience the richness of other cultures at the same time. 47 
For example, experiences of annexations, wars, limited sovereignty, and 
political disturbances shaped culture in the Republic of Poland. For these 
reasons, cultural identity and national heritage, including symbolic 
elements of culture, language, religious values, and historic remembrance, 
are the prime concern of national interests and cultural security of 
Poland.48  
 
Another group of cultural security definitions emphasizes the importance 
of wisely utilizing cultural heritage in order to achieve desirable results in 
the international arena, which subsequently results in the strengthening of 
national power.49 In this context, cultural heritage and achievement is a 
valuable tool to utilize in the global competition for soft power. Soft power 
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is a non-coercive form of power that a state uses as a means to influence 
and shape the preferences of others through attractive cultural, political, 
or ideological qualities in the realization of national interests.50 In the 
People’s Republic of China, cultural security is a vital component of non-
traditional national security and refers to the protection against spreading 
globalization and the influences of Western culture. Simultaneously, 
cultural security in China puts an emphasis not only on safeguarding 
cultural values, but also on the promotion of local culture globally to 
strengthen their international position and effectively compete for soft 
power.51 Similarly, in South Korea and Japan, cultural security involves 
efforts to promote Asian pop culture worldwide to increase cultural 
attractiveness and the opportunity to compete for global soft power.52 
 
Ultimately, cultural security refers to a broadly defined protection of 
tangible (for example, cultural or historic sites, cultural objects, and 
artwork) and non-tangible forms of culture (for example, cultural identity, 
or symbolic values). Furthermore, cultural security relates to the 
protection of human and cultural rights of both recipients and creators of 
culture. Cultural security can also involve the provision of cultural 
freedoms of thought, lifestyle, and liberty to fully enjoy cultural rights and 
participate in cultural reality. Lastly, cultural security concerns cultural, 
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and other minorities fostering an environment 
in which individuals experience a sense of cultural belonging and cultural 
safety.53 
 
Climate Change and Cultural Heritage 
 
As described previously, climate change has the potential to affect human 
populations considerably and therefore, their cultural security, by 
inducing a wide variety of physical and sociocultural changes. At their 
2005 convention, the World Heritage Center administered a global survey, 
asking participating states to describe the impact of climate change on 
their national cultural sites and heritage. Out of 110 responses submitted 
by 83 participants, 72 percent stated that climate change has affected their 
natural and cultural heritage.54  
 
One major threat to cultural security is the loss or destruction of habitable 
lands due to severe weather events, such as floods or droughts, as well as 
increasing temperatures, which can result in the disappearance of cultural 
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heritage or unique historic sites. One such endangered city is Venice, Italy, 
a United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO) World Heritage Site, which attracts millions of international 
tourists annually.55 Climate change, along with inadequate infrastructure 
and improper management of an increasing number of tourists, 
contributes to both the flooding and structural damage of this cultural and 
touristic landmark. While Venice has always been sensitive to changes in 
water level due to its location, the frequency and severity of flooding has 
increased in recent years due to globally rising sea levels and changes in 
annual weather patterns.56 Another example of a coastal city at risk is the 
ancient city of Alexandria, Egypt, which is on trajectory to submerge 
underwater by the year 2050 if climate change and subsequent sea level 
rise continues at its current rate.57 Not only is Alexandria a culturally and 
historically rich site, but also a regional economic center and one of 
Egypt’s most populous cities. It is important to highlight that ancient 
buildings were constructed to withstand the elements of a specific local 
climate, so building materials may not be able to survive a change in 
weather conditions.58 The disappearance of these coastal cities would not 
only adversely influence tourism but also damage national and global 
sociocultural heritage and have long-term negative economic 
consequences.  
 
Another cultural security concern pertinent to climate change is 
deforestation, caused either by severe weather events, such as wildfires, or 
due to human activity. Deforestation also leads to an increase in average 
global temperature, contributing to climate change and subsequent further 
deforestation, a cycle that continues with increasing intensity.59 One of the 
large-scale example is the Amazonian rainforest basin, which includes 
significant regions of Brazil, Bolivia, Peru, as well as parts of several other 
countries and is home to thousands of indigenous communities.60 
Deforestation results in the loss of territory and access to resources, all of 
which are fundamental to indigenous cultural identity. The loss of 
ancestral land poses a major threat, not only to the well-being and lives of 
indigenous populations, but also to the preservation of their unique 
cultures, knowledge, and languages.61  
 
Language is not only a utility communication tool, but it also allows 
speakers to express, create, and embrace their cultural reality.62 Language 
is uniquely important for indigenous populations, as it forms concurrently 
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with their specific culture and allows for the preservation and 
transmission of cultural values and knowledge from one generation to 
another.63 Presently, many indigenous languages are disappearing at an 
alarming rate and others are in danger of extinction.64 According to data 
from UNESCO's Atlas of World Languages in Danger, the Amazon 
rainforest basin is home to over 400 vulnerable or endangered languages 
(approximately 20 percent of the global total), and 30 more have already 
been lost permanently.65 However, not only do the indigenous 
communities suffer because of these losses, but humanity as a whole 
suffers. Language is not only a product of the cultures and communities 
that have developed it, but also conversely shapes the worldview and 
cultural framework for critical thinking and problem solving distinctly 
unique to those who are native speakers. Therefore, when a language is 
permanently lost, ancient knowledge, cultural heritage, and an entire 
sense of community are lost along with it.66  
 
Climate Change and Conflicts 
 
Over the last 30 years, approximately 18 violent conflicts have been 
associated with natural resources, as well as almost half of all civil wars 
since 1960.67 However, while recent research has shown that climate 
change may increase the risk of violent conflict, including organized armed 
conflict and terrorism, there is no strong consensus amongst content 
experts as to how significant that increase will be.68 Nonetheless, the 
expansion of unlivable regions has the potential to exacerbate regional 
conflicts, cause instability, and increase international confrontations over 
habitable areas, agricultural lands, and natural resources, particularly 
potable water. Thus, conflicts may arise in a situation where the supply of 
resources including croplands, forests, fisheries, marinas, and water is 
insufficient to meet the demand. Developing nations are particularly at 
risk of conflict and economic damage caused by these resource 
deficiencies, as agriculture and farming account for almost 65 percent of 
their Gross Domestic Product, on average.69 Ineffective governance, 
inadequate management of natural resources, and lack of environmental 
protections are also contributing factors towards conflict eruption. 
Moreover, competition to control access to renewable resources may lead 
to exploitation by armed groups and terrorist organizations. 70 There have 
been several case studies linking climate change to violent conflicts, 
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fragility, livelihood insecurity, urban violence, and competition for scarce 
environmental resources.71 Some recent examples include  
 
• The terrorist activity of Boko Haram around Lake Chad, an 
important source of water for millions, which has shrunk by over 90 
percent in the last 60 years;  
• The Islamic State and civil war in Syria exacerbated by conflicts 
over access to water resources after severe drought in 2011;  
• The Taliban and other insurgent driven criminal networks in 
Afghanistan organized around access to dwindling natural 
resources and opium; and  
• The organized crime gang activity in Guatemala, which is thriving 
due to the downstream economic effects of increasingly severe 
natural disasters and extreme weather events.72  
 
The World Resources Institute anticipates the risk of water-related 
conflicts to rise across Africa, the Middle East, as well as South and 
Southeast Asia in the near future.73 In the recent years, researchers 
examining the relationship between temperature rise and violence 
concluded that approximately every 0.3 degrees Celsius of warming 
correlates with a 10 to 20 percent increase in the likelihood of armed 
conflicts.74 Another group of researchers analyzing armed conflicts in the 
context of climate change found that 23 percent of conflicts in countries 
with ethnically diverse populations started in months marked by 
significant weather-related disasters.75 While climate change may not 
always be a direct trigger or primary cause for conflict eruption, it is likely 
to become a threat multiplier that can eventually lead to resource scarcity 
and increase the risk of conflict escalation further downstream.76 
 
Nevertheless, any significant conflict poses a serious threat to cultural 
security. Violent discord has a direct effect on the environment, local 
ecosystems, and other protected areas, as well as downstream effects on 
the health, cultural rights, sociocultural capital, and heritage of local 
populations. One global research organization conducted a study, which 
found that 32 states globally face extreme risk of conflict eruption or civil 
war due to worsening climate over the next 30 years.77 This can lead to the 
destruction of historical or cultural landmarks, monuments, sculptures, 
and natural sites (for example national parks, natural wonders), which is 
an important consideration when examining climate change-induced 
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conflicts. Wartime also extends to the treatment of works of art within the 
conflict zones. For example, during the Second World War, soldiers 
notably plundered artwork, as well as destroyed historic and cultural sites 
for strategic combat purposes.78 During this time, a great number of 
cultural artifacts, antiques, paintings, and other notable works of art went 
missing, due to large-scale looting, vandalism, destruction, and 
exploitation.79 While numerous laws and international regulations 
currently exist to protect cultural heritage worldwide, many cultural and 
historic sites do not survive protracted conflicts.80 One recent example is 
the Islamic State’s successful destruction and trafficking of ancient 
landmarks and artifacts from sites in Iraq and Syria to fund the militant 
group’s activities.81 As climate change continues to worsen, potentially 
leading to frequent outbreaks of conflict, many experts raise concerns 
about the continued development of similar practices and a growing 
underground transnational art crime network.82 
 
Climate Change and Migration 
 
Due to an increasing average global temperature, many regions will 
become unlivable, forcing millions of citizens and residents to flee their 
homelands and seek refuge in areas that are better suited for living.83 The 
World Bank estimates that regions of Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, 
and Southeast Asia will generate 143 million more climate migrants by 
2050.84 Although reported cases of climate-induced migration have been 
limited thus far, unchecked climate change will likely lead to an increase in 
mass migration.85  
 
Large-scale human migration results in the concurrent migration of a 
population’s cultures, languages, ideologies, and religious beliefs.86 
Contact between two or more distinct cultures can lead to both positive 
and negative outcomes.87 An example of a positive outcome would be the 
successful and balanced adaptation to a new reality. In this scenario, an 
individual would continue to practice their own cultural habits and beliefs 
freely, while fostering a respectful attitude and openness towards the new, 
unknown culture and its representatives. In 2015, The European 
Commission administered a survey to citizens of participating states, 
asking to what extent they consider themselves a citizen of European 
Union (EU). About 60 percent of respondents defined themselves as both 
Europeans and nationals of their country of origin.88 These results imply 
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that individuals demonstrate a positive attitude towards other cultures 
while remaining attached to their national cultures.89 On the other hand, 
negative outcomes could emerge, including a disregard or loss of one’s 
own culture, disdain for a new locally imposed culture, and increased 
tension between individuals from host states and newcomers, or even 
potential conflicts between cultural groups.90 Therefore, this can 
eventually lead to the emergence of negative social attitudes, including, 
amongst many, anomies, intolerance, and various forms of discrimination, 
denationalization, nationalism, and xenophobia.91 Furthermore, these 
negative experiences may contribute to the deepening of social inequalities 
and differences, often causing social unrest and cultural discontinuity, 
which can eventually result in cultural insecurity.92 It is noteworthy that in 
recent years there appears to be a decline in worldwide interest to 
welcome migrants from or into certain countries.93 Therefore, the societal 
discontent regarding an uncontrolled influx of foreigners, may be an 
exacerbating factor in emergence of negative feelings towards newcomers 
and their cultures, regardless of the reasons for migration. 
 
Climate-induced migration can also adversely affect cultural security 
through the processes of forced integration, assimilation, and cultural 
adaptation. Climate change contributes to the expansion of unlivable 
lands, leading to mass evacuation and the forcible relocation of affected 
populations. This raises questions regarding effective integration policies 
and the overall preparedness of receptive states to accept a large number 
of climate refugees from different cultural backgrounds.94 Mass migration 
produces different reactions amongst diverse populations, and often 
triggers debate regarding state immigration processes, requirements for 
receiving members of foreign states, and conditions that newcomers must 
meet in order to become full members of the hosting society.95 One of the 
overarching concerns regarding mass migration is how to ensure that 
individuals coming from diverse cultural backgrounds, especially those 
with opposing cultural identities, succeed in their new environment 
culturally, economically, and socially. A recent example of mass migration 
includes exodus of African and Middle Eastern refugees fleeing conflicts, 
exacerbated by climate change, to the EU. Many of these migrants came 
from conservative Islamic cultures, which sparked new debates around the 
compatibility of their values with those of host states.96 Ultimately, this 
forced integration led to a reactionary rise in support of far-right 
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nationalist political parties and, furthermore, the creation of the Identity 
and Democracy far-right political bloc in the European Parliament.97  
 
Other fundamental questions emerge regarding protection of both the 
human and cultural rights of minority groups. The host state’s role is to 
create an environment in which individuals can succeed and experience 
cultural freedoms without fear of expressing their own cultural identities. 
Therefore, these more stable host states must take responsibility for 
safeguarding cultures, cultural identities, and rights of newly arrived 
minority representatives. The inability of a state to relocate newcomers 
successfully and effectively, results in the formation of new densely 
populated areas, such as refugee camps where individuals wait for further 
relocation, oftentimes in poor living conditions. 98 Consequently, these 
persistently overcrowded areas become increasingly dangerous, posing 
considerable threats to the overall security of refugees and cultural 
minorities coming from distant geographical locations. In addition, the 
accumulation of large groups of people may affect their physical and 
mental well-being, and contribute to increased social discontent and 
anxiety, eruption of conflicts, or even leave these populations vulnerable to 
outbreaks of violence or disease.99 Conversely, when a large number of 
newcomers arrive into a country, there is a risk of the emergence of 
cultural enclaves, where individuals do not attempt to integrate with local 
society, often due to lack of opportunity or insurmountable sociocultural 
barriers. On a larger scale, this practice can create tensions or conflicts 
over cultural differences, which may eventually lead to outbursts of 
violence or even hate crimes.100  
 
Climate Change and Statelessness 
 
The term stateless describes individuals who are not considered citizens or 
nationals by any state under the operations of its law. 101 The United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimates that there are 
approximately 4.2 million stateless persons around the world, although 
given the lack of data availability and reliability in some instances, this 
number may be much higher.102 The issue of statelessness is broad and can 
include individuals who formally hold a nationality, but cannot turn to the 
state for protection, because of their immigration status or due to an 
ineffective or corrupt system. 103 Statelessness violates a universal human 
right to nationality and prevents individuals from enjoying their basic 
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human and cultural rights. This is due to the lack of fundamental political, 
cultural, and social freedoms typically provided by the government and 
administration of a properly functioning state.104 One ongoing example is 
the nomadic Muslim tribes of Northern Kenya, Ethiopia, and Somalia, 
who have lived throughout these remote regions spread over multiple state 
lines long before colonial borders were drawn. These minority groups have 
suffered discrimination for decades in relation to their rights of citizenship 
and basic identity documents, leaving them stateless and without the 
fundamental economic, political, or sociocultural rights.105 In addition, a 
lack of nationality, documented immigration status, or citizenship may 
negatively affect one’s sense of sociocultural belonging and cultural 
identity. This inability to develop sociocultural bonds may lead to social 
exclusion, alienation, and finally loss of identity that is necessary to be a 
full member of society.106 While statelessness is already a focus area of 
many organizations, it is noteworthy that it closely relates to cultural 
security as well, as it frequently concerns members of various ethnic, 
cultural, or religious minorities, including indigenous groups.107 
 
Statelessness can occasionally take even more extreme forms and escalate 
to physical violence. One example that accurately reflects these severe 
consequences of statelessness is the situation of the Muslim Rohingya 
cultural and religious minority in Myanmar. In the recent years, the 
Myanmar government has declined to recognize Rohingyas as a legal 
minority, depriving them of rights to citizenship, and in result, leaving the 
Rohingya people stateless. Due to systematic oppression, increasing 
brutality, and ethnic cleansing, thousands of surviving Rohingyas have had 
to relocate internally or have fled Myanmar since 2017.108 
 
Evidence of large-scale climate change-induced statelessness is thus far 
limited. Nevertheless, progressing climate change is likely to increase the 
number of stateless individuals globally, as the amount of habitable land 
decreases while instances of climate-related conflicts and mass migration 
increase. Notably, most recent examples of statelessness are mainly due to 
violent conflicts in unstable regions or failed states and include conflicts in 
Syria, Darfur, South Sudan, Iraq, and Rwanda.109 In addition, the 
populations of low-lying states (for example, the Maldives, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands) may need to evacuate due to rising sea levels and the 
possible submergence of their lands.110 While the loss of territory due to 
land submersion is unlikely to occur before the end of the 21st century, 
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extreme weather events will most likely continue to increase in 
frequency.111 Therefore, these low-lying states are likely to become 
uninhabitable before complete submersion of their lands, causing a large 
number of people to experience statelessness for the first time.112  
 
Conclusions 
 
The aim of this article has been to provide a non-comprehensive overview 
of how climate change can affect cultural security. Based on the literature 
review performed to explore these topics, the authors have concluded that 
climate change does pose a threat to many aspects of cultural security. 
Climate change is an exacerbating factor in conflict eruption, and the 
world is already witnessing competition for limited natural resources. 
Inadequate access and scarcity of renewable resources indirectly 
contributed to the outbreak of civil war in Syria in 2011 and disturbances 
in Mali in 2019, and this will likely occur more frequently as climate 
change worsens.113 As climate change continues to accelerate, it can 
potentially lead to an increase in terrorist activity and the outbreak of 
violent conflicts over habitable lands and renewable resources.114 These 
conflicts put the livelihood of local inhabitants in danger and can 
contribute to the devastation of important cultural and historic sites, 
posing a major threat to cultural creations and local populations, and 
hindering their cultural security. 115 
 
Climate change will also likely continue to increase severe weather event 
frequency and duration, putting many coastal historic and cultural sights 
in danger of destruction. The World Heritage sites of the City of London 
on the banks of the River Thames, as well as the historic center of 13th 
century Cesky Krumlov town are both at risk of experiencing severe floods. 
Tidal floods, from increasingly frequent high tides and rising sea levels, 
also threaten Venice, Italy, an area historically prone to flooding due to its 
sensitivity to small changes in water level.116 This could be a forewarning 
as to what may happen to other at and below sea level regions around the 
world, as the average global temperature increases further, if climate 
change continues to worsen.  
 
Indigenous communities are especially vulnerable to the effects of climate 
change, as it can negatively affect their resilience and destroy the 
sociocultural continuity of their communities. Consequently, climate 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
17 
change impacts can negatively affect their safety, cultural identities, 
health, and economy.117 Members of indigenous communities are often the 
most susceptible to cultural extinction due to living in remote locations, 
dwindling populations, and lack of written records. This can lead to the 
permanent loss of language, ancient knowledge, cultural heritage, and an 
entire community along with it. Therefore, it is important to assist these 
communities in their survival in the years to come, considering they have 
not contributed towards climate change.  
 
The findings that the authors present also suggest that climate change can 
become a major driving factor for mass displacement due to the loss of 
habitable lands, which can eventually lead to the disappearance of local 
cultures and identities.118 Mass migration can subsequently contribute to 
the development of negative social behaviors and attitudes between 
climate refugees and host societies, who may fear for their cultural 
integrity.119 This can further lead to political radicalization, polarization, 
and even paralysis of the political system and democracy of the host 
states.120 Large-scale migration, without adequate systems and processes 
in place, can also create stateless individuals whose human and cultural 
rights are in danger of violation. The United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees currently has a plan in place to end statelessness in Europe by 
2024 but admits this is not feasible in other parts of the world without 
significant international collaboration and capital investment.121 Finally, 
the mass exodus of climate migrants can lead to an increased emergence of 
refugee camps, which, along with other well-documented hazards, put 
displaced populations at risk due to the aforementioned increase in 
extreme weather conditions. For example, in 2018, several refugee camps 
in Africa and Asia experienced the occurrence of severe weather events 
that significantly affected and damaged camp areas.122  
 
This literature review exploring the link between climate change and 
cultural security presents only a narrow, yet important, view of relevant 
issues. As climate change continues to worsen and the average global 
temperature continues to rise, more threats to cultural security will begin 
to emerge. Therefore, there is a need to continue to increase global 
awareness regarding the importance of slowing and stopping climate 
change, as well as the potential wide-reaching cultural consequences. It is 
also essential for both state and nonstate actors to make significant efforts 
in combating climate change and develop strategic imperatives with 
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concrete action plans to address these potential threats to security. 
However, without some significant renovation and reformation to the 
modern liberal order and improvements in transnational cooperation, the 
outlook is tenuous, at best. Even if states continue to implement the Paris 
Agreement obligations diligently, which thus far, has not been the case, the 
world will still experience a 3.2 degree Celsius temperature increase by the 
end of this century.123 The potentially economically restrictive obligations 
imposed on states participating in the Paris Agreement contributed to the 
rise of nationalistic populism in some states. Therefore, it may be fruitful 
to pursue further research regarding the reciprocal relationship between 
the breakdown of neoliberalism and worsening climate change, and its 
effects on different aspects of cultural security. Without any sort of 
comprehensive, executable, and globally accepted action plan, the cultural 
security of millions, especially populations that are already vulnerable, 
remains at risk. Ultimately, climate change is a global crisis and thus 
requires global solutions and actions to ensure stability of the global order. 
Therefore, it is the hope of the authors that the information presented in 
this article will lead to further discussion and research in this field, as well 
as the development of relevant global strategies and policies to address 
these issues before it becomes too late. 
 
 
Endnotes 
 
1  “Scientific Consensus: Earth’s Climate is Warming,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, last modified October 21, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/scientific-
consensus/. 
2  “Climate Change: How Do We Know?,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, last modified October 16, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/; 
David Chandler, “Climate Myths: It’s Been Far Warmer in the Past, What’s the Big 
Deal?,” New Scientist, May 16, 2007, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11647-
climate-myths-its-been-far-warmer-in-the-past-whats-the-big-deal/; Rebecca Lindsey, 
“Climate Change: Global Sea Level,” Climate.gov, last modified August 14, 2020, 
https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-climate/climate-change-
global-sea-level; Kanta Kumari Rigaud, et al., “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal 
Climate Migration,” The World Bank, March 19, 2018, chap. 1, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461; International 
Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change Report No. 31, April 2008, 
11-20, https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg31-migration-and-climate-change. 
3  Dominic Kniveton et al., Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to 
Estimate Flows (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008), 25-28; 
“Climate Change in the Maldives,” The World Bank, April 6, 2010, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/04/06/climate-change-in-the-
maldives.  
4  United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Climate Change and 
World Heritage Report No. 22, May 2007, https://whc.unesco.org/en/series/22/; 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
19 
 
“Venice Population 2020,” World Population Review, last accessed October 15, 2020, 
https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/venice-population; Christopher 
Flavelle, Denise Lu, “Rising Seas Will Erase More Cities by 2050, New Research 
Shows,” New York Times, October 29, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/29/climate/coastal-cities-
underwater.html; Daisy Dunne, “Deforestation Has Driven Up Hottest Day 
Temperatures,” Carbon Brief, April 23, 2018, 
https://www.carbonbrief.org/deforestation-has-driven-up-hottest-day-temperatures. 
5  Katherine J. Mach et al., “Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict,” Nature 571 
(2019): 193-197, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1300-6; Climate Diplomacy, 
Report: Insurgency, Terrorism and Organized Crime in a Warming Climate, October 
2016, https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-terrorism-and-
organised-crime-warming-climate; Climate Diplomacy, Report: Insurgency, Terrorism 
and Organized Crime, 8-45, https://www.climate-
diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-
climate; Peter Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria,” 
Weather, Climate and Society 6, no. 3 (July 2014), https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-
13-00059.1; Michael Werz, Laura Conley, “Climate Change, Migration, and Conflict in 
Northwest Africa,” Center for American Progress, April 18, 2012, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2012/04/18/11439/climat
e-change-migration-and-conflict-in-northwest-africa/; Leon Usigbe, “Drying Lake 
Chad Basin Gives Rise to Crisis. Food Insecurity, Conflicts, Terrorism, Displacement 
and Climate Change Effects Compound Challenges,” United Nations Africa Renewal, 
December 24, 2019, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-
march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis. 
6  Simon Dalby, “Climate Change and Environmental Security,” in Security Studies. An 
Introduction, ed. Paul D. Williams, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis 
Group. 2013), 313-317; Jon Barnett, “Environmental Security”, in Contemporary 
Security Studies, ed. Alan Collins, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 235-
243; Zdzisław Maślak, “Bezpieczeństwo ekologiczna” [Environmental Security], in 
Podstawy bezpieczeństwa narodowego państwa [Fundamentals of National Security 
of the State] (Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2017), 479-496; Dominic 
Kniveton et al., Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to Estimate 
Flows (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008), 25-28; Admir Skodo, 
“Sweden: By Turns Welcoming and Restrictive it its Immigration Policy,” Migration 
Policy Institute, December 6, 2018, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden-
turns-welcoming-and-restrictive-its-immigration-policy. 
7  Jan Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], in Podstawy 
bezpieczeństwa narodowego państwa [Fundamentals of National Security of the State] 
(Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2017), 436-437; Dominika Jach, “Wybrane 
zagadnienia z zakresu bezpieczeństwa kulturowego” [Selected Aspects of Cultural 
Security], Wiedza Obronna 1-2, no. 262-263 (May 2018): 135-136.  
8  Brad K. Blitz, “Statelessness and Cultural Security,” in Handbook of Cultural Security, 
ed. Yasushi Watanabe (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, May 2018), 167; 
Yasushi Watanabe, “Introduction,” in Handbook of Cultural Security (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 4-8; Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural 
Security], 437; Majid Tehranian, “Cultural Security and Global Governance: 
International Migration and Negotiation of Identity,” in Worlds on the Move. 
Globalization, Migration, and Cultural Security, eds. Jonathan Friedman, Shalini 
Randeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 4-6. 
9  Dominic Kniveton et al., Climate Change and Migration: Improving Methodologies to 
Estimate Flows (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2008), 25-28; 
“Climate Change in the Maldives,” The World Bank, April 6, 2010, 
https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2010/04/06/climate-change-in-the-
maldives.  
10 Agata Włodkowska, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], in Bezpieczeństwo 
państwa [State Security], eds. Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk, Anna Materska-Sosnowska 
Krupocin and Krupocin: The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
20 
 
(Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA JR, 2009), 13-14; International Organization for 
Migration, Migration and Climate Change Report No. 31, April 2008, 11-20, 
https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg31-migration-and-climate-change; 
“Climate Change: The Effects on Climate Change on Indigenous Peoples,” United 
Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, accessed October 18, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/climate-change.html.  
11 Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak, “Spotkanie kultur z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa – szanse i 
zagrożenia” [Encounter of Cultures from the Perspective of Security – Opportunities 
and Threats], in Współczesne Bezpieczeństwo Kulturowe [Contemporary Cultural 
Security], eds. Paweł Żakowski, Stanisław Topolewski (Siedlce: Wydawnictwo UPH w 
Siedlcach, 2014), 46-54; Dominika Jach, “Wybrane zagadnienia z zakresu 
bezpieczeństwa kulturowego” [Selected Aspects of Cultural Security], Wiedza Obronna 
1-2, no. 262-263 (May 2018): 138-141. 
12 Climate Diplomacy, Report: Insurgency, Terrorism and Organized Crime in a 
Warming Climate, October 2016, https://www.climate-
diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-
climate. 
13 Sean Nealon, “Methane Muted: How Did Early Earth Stay Warm?,” Astrobiology at 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, last modified October 19, 2020, 
https://astrobiology.nasa.gov/news/methane-muted-how-did-early-earth-stay-warm/; 
David Chandler, “Climate Myths: It’s Been Far Warmer in the Past, What’s the Big 
Deal?,” New Scientist, May 16, 2007, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11647-
climate-myths-its-been-far-warmer-in-the-past-whats-the-big-deal/; “Climate Change: 
How Do We Know?,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, last modified 
October 16, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/; “Glacial-Interglacial Cycles,” 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed October 17, 2020, 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/abrupt-climate-change/Glacial-Interglacial%20Cycles.  
14 “Early Life on Earth – Animal Origins,” National Museum of Natural History, accessed 
October 18, 2020, https://naturalhistory.si.edu/education/teaching-resources/life-
science/early-life-earth-animal-origins.  
15 Yuval Noah Harari, Sapiens. A Brief History of Humankind (New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, 2015), 63-74. 
16 “Climate Change: How Do We Know?,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, last modified October 16, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/; 
David Chandler, “Climate Myths: It’s Been Far Warmer in the Past, What’s the Big 
Deal?,” New Scientist, May 16, 2007, https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn11647-
climate-myths-its-been-far-warmer-in-the-past-whats-the-big-deal/; Will Steffen et al., 
“The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship,” Ambio 40 
(October 2011): 739-761, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-011-0185-x. 
17 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. 
Summary for Policymakers, May 27, 2020, 2-6, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/.  
18 Will Steffen et al., “The Anthropocene: From Global Change to Planetary Stewardship,” 
Ambio 40 (October 2011): 752-757, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13280-011-0185-x. 
19 World Meteorological Organization, The Global Climate in 2015-2019 Report, last 
modified 2020, 4-6, https://library.wmo.int/doc_num.php?explnum_id=10251.  
20 Rebecca Lindsey, “Climate Change: Global Sea Level,” Climate.gov, last modified 
August 14, 2020, https://www.climate.gov/news-features/understanding-
climate/climate-change-global-sea-level. 
21 Laure Zanna, et al., “Global Reconstruction of Historical Ocean Heat Storage and 
Transport,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of 
America, January 7, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1808838115; “Climate 
Change: How Do We Know?,” National Aeronautics and Space Administration, last 
modified October 16, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/. 
22 “State of the Cryosphere: Is the Cryosphere Sending Signals about Climate Change?,” 
National Snow and Ice Data Center, accessed May 25, 2019, 
https://nsidc.org/cryosphere/sotc. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
21 
 
23 “Shifting Seasons,” Conservation in a Changing Climate, accessed May 29, 2020, 
https://climatechange.lta.org/climate-impacts/shifting-seasons/. 
24 “State of the Climate: Hurricanes and Tropical Storms – Annual 2019,” National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, accessed May 29, 2020, 
https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/tropical-cyclones/201913. 
25 “Climate Change: How Do We Know?,” National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, last modified October 16, 2020, https://climate.nasa.gov/evidence/. 
26 “A Historical Perspective on Drought,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration, accessed May 30, 2020, https://www.ncei.noaa.gov/news/historical-
perspective-drought. 
27 Jessie Yeung, “Australia’s Deadly Wildfires Are Showing No Signs of Stopping. Here’s 
What You Need to Know,” CNN, last modified January 13, 2020, 
https://www.cnn.com/2020/01/01/australia/australia-fires-explainer-intl-hnk-
scli/index.html. 
28 “People and the Ocean,” United Nations Ocean Conference, accessed June 5, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/conferences/ocean2020/facts-figures. 
29 Renee Cho, “How Climate Will Alter Our Food?,” Columbia University, July 25, 2018, 
https://blogs.ei.columbia.edu/2018/07/25/climate-change-food-agriculture/. 
30 Devon Ryan, “Stanford-Led Study Investigates How Much Climate Change Affects the 
Risk of Armed Conflict,” Stanford News, June 12, 2019, 
https://news.stanford.edu/2019/06/12/climate-change-cause-armed-conflict/; 
Katherine J. March et al., “Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict,” Nature 571 
(2019): 193-197, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1300-6. 
31 Colin Raymond, et al., “The Emergence of Heat and Humidity Too Severe for Human 
Tolerance,” Science Advances 6, no. 19 (May 2020), 
https://doi.org/10.1126/sciadv.aaw1838. 
32 Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization (New 
York: Random House, 2016), 106, 252, 367-380. 
33 Barbara Szacka, Wprowadzenie do socjologii [Introduction to Sociology] (Warsaw: 
Oficyna Naukowa, 2003), 244-250, 256-267.  
34 “Boko Haram in Nigeria,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified October 21, 
2020, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/boko-haram-nigeria.; Erin 
Blakemore, “What Was the Arab Spring and How Did It Spread?,” National 
Geographic, March 29, 2019, 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/topics/reference/arab-spring-cause/; 
“Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified October 21, 
2020, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/nagorno-karabakh-conflict; 
“Bosnian War,” Wikipedia, last accessed October 19, 2020, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bosnian_War. 
35 Majid Tehranian, “Cultural Security and Global Governance: International Migration 
and Negotiation of Identity,” in Worlds on the Move. Globalization, Migration, and 
Cultural Security, eds. Jonathan Friedman, Shalini Randeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2004), 3; Jan Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], in Podstawy 
bezpieczeństwa narodowego państwa [Fundamentals of National Security of the State] 
(Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2017), 430; Erik Nemeth, Cultural Security. 
Evaluating the Power of Culture in International Affairs (London: Imperial College 
Press, 2015), chap. Introduction, Kindle.  
36 Julian Kaczmarek, Wojciech Łepkowski, Bogdan Zdrodowski eds., Słownik terminów z 
zakresu bezpieczeństwa narodowego [Glossary of Terms in the Field of National 
Security] (Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2008), 14-15; Czaja, 
“Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], 427. 
37 Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], 434; Majid Tehranian, “Cultural 
Security and Global Governance: International Migration and Negotiation of Identity,” 
in Worlds on the Move. Globalization, Migration, and Cultural Security, eds. Jonathan 
Friedman, Shalini Randeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 3-10; Yasushi Watanabe, 
“Introduction,” in Handbook of Cultural Security (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2018), 4-9; David Andersen-Rodgers, Kerry Crawford, Human Security: 
Krupocin and Krupocin: The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
22 
 
Theory and Action (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), 3-4, 25-34; Barry Buzan, 
Ole Wæver, Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework For Analysis (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 119-120. Buzan et al., describe societal security that refers to 
collective identity. Collective identity is a component of cultural security. 
38 Watanabe, Handbook of Cultural Security, 4-5, 9-13.  
39 Joseph Nye, Jr., Soft Power. The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: 
PublicAffairs, 2004), 5-11; Mely Caballero-Anthony, An Introduction to Non-
Traditional Security Studies: A Transnational Approach (Thousand Oaks: SAGE 
Publications, 2016), chap. 1, Kindle.  
40 Majid Tehranian, “Cultural Security and Global Governance: International Migration 
and Negotiation of Identity,” in Worlds on the Move. Globalization, Migration, and 
Cultural Security, eds. Jonathan Friedman, Shalini Randeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 
2004), 3-10; Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework For Analysis (London: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 119-120. 
41 Andrei Richter, “Cultural Security of Ukraine in Times of Conflict: Legal Aspects,” in 
Handbook of Cultural Security, ed. Yasushi Watanabe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2018), 461-482.  
42 Jessica C. Lai, “Intellectual Property and Indigenous Culture,” in Handbook of Cultural 
Security, ed. Yasushi Watanabe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 72-102; 
”Traditional Knowledge, Innovations, and Practices,” Convention on Biological 
Diversity, last modified September 23, 2020, 
https://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml; “Traditional Cultural Expressions,” 
World Intellectual Property Organization, accessed October 20, 2020, 
https://www.wipo.int/tk/en/folklore.  
43 Yasushi Watanabe, “Introduction,” in Handbook of Cultural Security (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 4-9; Majid Tehranian, “Cultural Security and Global 
Governance: International Migration and Negotiation of Identity,” in Worlds on the 
Move. Globalization, Migration, and Cultural Security, eds. Jonathan Friedman, 
Shalini Randeria (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), 3-4; Buzan et al., Security: A New 
Framework For Analysis (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998), 119-120. 
44 Hassan Isilow, “Africa Faces Major Challenges in 2020,” Anadolu Agency, December 
30, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/africa-faces-major-challenges-in-
2020/1687364.  
45 Tatah Mentan, Africa Facing Human Security Challenges in the 21st Century 
(Cameroon: Langaa Research & Publishing Common Initiative Group), 288-308; 
Daniel Etounga-Manguelle, “Does Africa Need a Cultural Adjustment Program?,” in 
Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress, eds. Lawrence E. Harrison, 
Samuel P. Huntington (New York: Basic Books, 2000), 65-77. 
46 Jan Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], in Podstawy 
bezpieczeństwa narodowego państwa [Fundamentals of National Security of the State] 
(Warsaw: Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2017), 436-437; Tadeusz Jemioło, 
“Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe w warunkach globalizacji i procesów społecznych” [Cultural 
Security in the Conditions of Globalization and Social Processes], Zeszyt Problemowy 
TWO 25, no. 3 (2001): 20; Andrzej Dawidczyk, Nowe wyzwania, zagrożenia i szanse 
dla bezpieczeństwa Polski u progu XXI wieku [New Challenges, Threats, and 
Opportunities for Poland’s Security at the Threshold of the 21st Century] (Warsaw: 
Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2001), 16. 
47 Czaja, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], 436-437. 
48 Jan Czaja, Kulturowy wymiar bezpieczeństwa. Aspekty teoretyczne i praktyczne 
[Cultural Dimensions of Security. Theoretical and Practical Aspects] (Kraków: Oficyna 
Wydawnicza AFM, 2013), 146-147. 
49 Waldemar Kitler, Obrona Narodowa III RP. Pojęcie, organizacja, system [National 
Defense of the 3rd Republic of Poland. Concept, Organization, System] (Warsaw: 
Akademia Obrony Narodowej, 2002), 339. 
50 Yasushi Watanabe, “Introduction,” in Handbook of Cultural Security (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 4-5, 9-13; Joseph Nye Jr., “The Benefits of Soft 
Power,” August 2, 2004, https://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/the-benefits-of-soft-power. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
23 
 
51 Lin Han, “Chinese Cultural Security in the Information Communication Era,” Institute 
for Security and Development Policy: Focus Asia, no. 6 (February 2014): 1-7, 
https://isdp.eu/publication/chinese-cultural-security-information-communication-
era/; Eleanor Albert, “China’s Big Bet on Soft Power,” Council on Foreign Relations, 
last modified February 9, 2018, https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/chinas-big-bet-
soft-power; Jacques deLisle, “Foreign Policy through Other Means: Hard Power, Soft 
Power, and China’s Turn to Political Warfare to Influence the United States,” Orbis 64, 
no. 2 (March 2020): 174-206, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2020.02.004.  
52 Chua Beng Huat, “Pop Culture and Soft Power Competition in East Asia,” in Handbook 
of Cultural Security, ed. Yasushi Watanabe (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2018), 378-394. 
53 Dominika Krupocin, “Cultural Security: Concept Evaluation Based on Selected 
Education Programs Addressed to Foreign Language Learners” (PhD diss., War Studies 
University of Warsaw, 2020), 161-164. 
54 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Climate Change and 
World Heritage Report No. 22, May 2007, https://whc.unesco.org/en/series/22/. 
55 “Venice Population 2020,” World Population Review, last accessed October 15, 2020, 
https://worldpopulationreview.com/world-cities/venice-population. 
56 Fabio Trincardi et al., “The 1966 Flooding of Venice. What Time Taught Us for the 
Future,” Oceanography 29, no. 4 (2016): 178-186, 
https://doi.org/10.5670/oceanog.2016.87. 
57 Christopher Flavelle, Denise Lu, “Rising Seas Will Erase More Cities by 2050, New 
Research Shows,” New York Times, October 29, 2019, 
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/10/29/climate/coastal-cities-
underwater.html. 
58 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Climate Change and 
World Heritage Report No. 22, May 2007, https://whc.unesco.org/en/series/22/. 
59 Daisy Dunne, “Deforestation Has Driven Up Hottest Day Temperatures,” Carbon Brief, 
April 23, 2018, https://www.carbonbrief.org/deforestation-has-driven-up-hottest-day-
temperatures. 
60 “Brazil and the Amazon Forest,” Greenpeace, accessed June 1, 2020, 
https://www.greenpeace.org/usa/issues/brazil-and-the-amazon-forest/. 
61 “Indigenous Peoples: Culture,” United Nations Department of Economics and Social 
Affairs, last accessed October 20, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/mandated-
areas1/culture.html; “Indigenous Peoples: Environment,” United Nations Department 
of Economics and Social Affairs, last accessed October 20, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/mandated-
areas1/environment.html. 
62 Claire Kramsch, Language and Culture (United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 3-4, 65-69. 
63 “10 Things to Know About Indigenous Peoples,” United Nations Development 
Program, January 25, 2019, https://stories.undp.org/10-things-we-all-should-know-
about-indigenous-people.  
64 “Many Indigenous Languages Are in Danger of Extinction,” United Nations Human 
Rights Office of the High Commissioner, October 17, 2019, 
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Indigenouslanguages.aspx. 
65 “Atlas of the World’s Languages in Danger,” United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organization, modified July 5, 2017, http://www.unesco.org/languages-
atlas/index.php. 
66 David Harrison, When Languages Die. The Extinction of the World’s Languages and 
the Erosion of Human Knowledge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 3-23; 
https://www.un.org/development/desa/indigenouspeoples/mandated-
areas1/culture.html.  
67 The European Union-United Nations Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and 
Conflict Prevention, Renewable Resources and Conflict Report, 2012, 
https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/renewable-resources.shtml.  
Krupocin and Krupocin: The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
24 
 
68 Devon Ryan, “Stanford-Led Study Investigates How Much Climate Change Affects the 
Risk of Armed Conflict,” Stanford News, June 12, 2019, 
https://news.stanford.edu/2019/06/12/climate-change-cause-armed-conflict/; 
Katherine J. Mach et al., “Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict,” Nature 571 
(2019): 193-197, https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-019-1300-6; Halvard Buhaug et al., 
“One Effect to Rule Them All? A Comment on Climate and Conflict,” Climatic Change 
127 (October 2014): 391-397, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-014-1266-1; Solomon 
Hsiang et al., “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” Science 341, 
no. 6151 (September 2013), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235367.  
69 World Bank Development Indicators Database (object name Employment in 
Agriculture, license number SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS; accessed October 18, 2020); World 
Bank Development Indicators (object name Table 4.2 Structure of Output; last 
modified October 15,2020), http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/4.2 
https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.AGR.EMPL.ZS. 
70 The European Union-United Nations Partnership on Land, Natural Resources and 
Conflict Prevention, Renewable Resources and Conflict Report, 2012, 
https://www.un.org/en/land-natural-resources-conflict/renewable-resources.shtml. 
71 Climate Diplomacy, Report: Insurgency, Terrorism and Organized Crime in a 
Warming Climate, October 2016, https://www.climate-
diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-
climate. 
72 Climate Diplomacy, Insurgency, Terrorism and Organized Crime, 8-45, 
https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-terrorism-and-
organised-crime-warming-climate; Peter Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and 
Conflict in Syria,” Weather, Climate and Society 6, no. 3 (July 2014), 
https://doi.org/10.1175/WCAS-D-13-00059.1; Michael Werz, Laura Conley, “Climate 
Change, Migration, and Conflict in Northwest Africa,” Center for American Progress, 
April 18, 2012, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2012/04/18/11439/climat
e-change-migration-and-conflict-in-northwest-africa/; Leon Usigbe, “Drying Lake 
Chad Basin Gives Rise to Crisis. Food Insecurity, Conflicts, Terrorism, Displacement 
and Climate Change Effects Compound Challenges,” United Nations Africa Renewal, 
December 24, 2019, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/december-2019-
march-2020/drying-lake-chad-basin-gives-rise-crisis. 
73 “Significant Risk of Water-Related Conflict in Parts of Iraq, Iran, Mali, Nigeria, India 
and Pakistan Over Next 12 Months,” World Resources Institute, December 5, 2019, 
https://www.wri.org/news/2019/12/release-significant-risk-water-related-conflict-
parts-iraq-iran-mali-nigeria-india-and.  
74 Solomon Hsiang et al., “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” 
Science 341, no. 6151 (September 2013), https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1235367; 
David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming (New York: Tim 
Dougan Books, 2019), 125. 
75 David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth, 127.  
76 Jon Barnett, “Environmental Security”, in Contemporary Security Studies, ed. Alan 
Collins, 4th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), 235-237; Carl-Friedrich 
Schleussner et al., “Armed-Conflict Risk Enhanced by Climate-Related Disasters in 
Ethnically Fractionalized Countries,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 
113, no. 33 (August 2016), https://www.pnas.org/content/113/33/9216; Climate 
Diplomacy, Report: Insurgency, Terrorism and Organized Crime in a Warming 
Climate, October 2016, https://www.climate-diplomacy.org/publications/insurgency-
terrorism-and-organised-crime-warming-climate.  
77 David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable Earth: Life After Warming (New York: Tim 
Dougan Books, 2019), 126-127.  
78 Erik Nemeth, Cultural Security. Evaluating the Power of Culture in International 
Affairs (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), chap. 3, Kindle.  
79 Erik Nemeth, Cultural Security, chap. 7, Kindle. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
25 
 
80 Mariusz Kubiak, “Ochrona dóbr kultury w międzynarodowym prawie konfliktów 
zbrojnych” [Protection of Cultural Property in the International Law of Armed 
Conflicts], in Bezpieczeństwo i edukacja dla bezpieczeństwa w zmieniającej się 
przestrzeni społecznej i kulturowej [Safety and Education for Safety in the Changing 
Social and Cultural Space], ed. Ryszard Rosa (Siedlce: Uniwersytet Przyrodniczo-
Humanistyczny w Siedlcach), 192-207.  
81 Jane O’Brien, “IS Looting Provokes Call for Global Response,” BBC News, April 17, 
2015, https://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-32329681. 
82 Erik Nemeth, Cultural Security. Evaluating the Power of Culture in International 
Affairs (London: Imperial College Press, 2015), chap. 1, 5, 7, Kindle. 
83 Parag Khanna, Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization (New 
York: Random House, 2016), 367-380.  
84 Kanta Kumari Rigaud, et al., “Groundswell: Preparing for Internal Climate Migration,” 
The World Bank, March 19, 2018, chap. 1, 
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/29461; International 
Organization for Migration, Migration and Climate Change Report No. 31, April 2008, 
11-20, https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg31-migration-and-climate-change. 
85 John Podesta, “The Climate Crisis, Migration, and Refugees,” Brookings, July 25, 2019, 
https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-climate-crisis-migration-and-refugees/. 
86 Agata Włodkowska, “Bezpieczeństwo kulturowe” [Cultural Security], in Bezpieczeństwo 
państwa [State Security], eds. Konstanty A. Wojtaszczyk, Anna Materska-Sosnowska 
(Warsaw: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA JR, 2009), 13-14. 
87 Krystyna Najder-Stefaniak, “Spotkanie kultur z perspektywy bezpieczeństwa – szanse i 
zagrożenia” [Encounter of Cultures from the Perspective of Security – Opportunities 
and Threats], in Współczesne Bezpieczeństwo Kulturowe [Contemporary Cultural 
Security], eds. Paweł Żakowski, Stanisław Topolewski (Siedlce: Wydawnictwo UPH w 
Siedlcach, 2014), 46-54; Krystian Kiszka, “Tożsamość kulturowa Europy, a integracja 
imigrantów muzułmańskich” [Cultural Identity of Europe and the Integration of 
Muslim Immigrants], in Współczesne Bezpieczeństwo Kulturowe [Contemporary 
Cultural Security], eds. Paweł Żakowski, Stanisław Topolewski (Siedlce: Wydawnictwo 
UPH w Siedlcach, 2014), 154-168. 
88 European Commission, 2015 Standard Eurobarometer 83 Report, May 2015, 
https://ec.europa.eu/commfrontoffice/publicopinion/index.cfm.  
89 Ulrich Beck, Edgar Grande, Europa Kosmopolityczna [Cosmopolitan Europe], trans. 
Aleksander Ochocki (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe SCHOLAR, 2009), 73-76. 
90 Samuel P. Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer 
1993): 25-29.  
91 Dominika Jach, “Wybrane aspekty bezpieczeństwa kulturowego,” Wiedza Obronna 1-2, 
no. 262-263 (May 2018): 140. 
92 Yasushi Watanabe, “Introduction,” in Handbook of Cultural Security (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing, 2018), 4-5; Paweł Żarkowski, Miejsce bezpieczeństwa 
kulturowego we współczesnym świecie [Place of Cultural Security in the Modern 
World], in Współczesne Bezpieczeństwo Kulturowe [Contemporary Cultural Security], 
eds. Paweł Żakowski, Stanisław Topolewski (Siedlce: Wydawnictwo UPH w Siedlcach, 
2014), 107. 
93 Phillip Connor, Jens Manuel Krogstad, “Many Worldwide Oppose More Migration – 
Both Into and Out of Their Countries,” Pew Research Center, December 10, 2018, 
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/12/10/many-worldwide-oppose-more-
migration-both-into-and-out-of-their-countries/. 
94 Mark R. D. Johnson et al., “Refugees and Other New Migrants: A Review of the 
Evidence on Successful Approaches to Integration,” Research Gate (March 26, 2015): 1-
80; 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/265065791_Refugees_and_Other_New_M
igrants_A_Review_of_the_Evidence_on_Successful_Approaches_to_Integration; 
Reva Dhingra, “Keeping Syrian Refugees in Neighboring Countries Isn’t Working. 
Here’s Why,” Washington Post, March 10, 2020, 
Krupocin and Krupocin: The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
26 
 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2020/03/10/keeping-syrian-refugees-
neighboring-countries-isnt-working-heres-why/. 
95 Yuval Noah Harari, 21 Lessons for the 21st Century (New York: Spiegel & Grau, 2019), 
141-151. 
96 Krystian Kiszka, “Tożsamość kulturowa Europy, a integracja imigrantów 
muzułmańskich” [Cultural Identity of Europe and the Integration of Muslim 
Immigrants], in Współczesne Bezpieczeństwo Kulturowe [Contemporary Cultural 
Security], eds. Paweł Żakowski, Stanisław Topolewski (Siedlce: Wydawnictwo UPH w 
Siedlcach, 2014), 155-168; Alan Makovsky, “Turkey’s Refugee Dilemma,” Center for 
American Progress, March 13, 2019, 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/security/reports/2019/03/13/467183/turke
ys-refugee-dilemma/. 
97 “Europe and Right-Wing Nationalism: A Country-by-Country Guide,” BBC News, 
November 13, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36130006. 
98 “Why Is There a Crisis in Calais?,” BBC News¸ October 3, 2015, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-29074736; Richard Skretteberg, “The Rohingya. 
Trapped in the World’s Largest Refugee Camp,” Norwegian Refugee Council, August 
25, 2019, https://www.nrc.no/perspectives/2019/trapped-in-the-worlds-largest-
refugee-camp/. 
99 “10 Things to Know about the Health of Refugees and Migrants,” World Health 
Organization, January 21, 2019, https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-
stories/detail/10-things-to-know-about-the-health-of-refugees-and-migrants; 
Marianna Karakoulaki, “The Invisible Violence of Europe’s Refugee Camps,” Al 
Jazeera, October 22, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/invisible-
violence-europe-refugee-camps-191021185959684.html. 
100 Admir Skodo, “Sweden: By Turns Welcoming and Restrictive in its Immigration 
Policy,” Migration Policy Institute, December 6, 2018, 
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/sweden-turns-welcoming-and-restrictive-its-
immigration-policy. 
101 United Nation Refugee Agency, 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless 
Persons, September 1954, https://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/protection/statelessness/3bbb25729/convention-relating-status-stateless-
persons.html.  
102 “Statelessness,” U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Population, Refugees, and 
Migration, accessed October 21,2020, https://www.state.gov/other-policy-
issues/statelessness/. 
103 Brad Blitz, “Statelessness and cultural security,” in Handbook of Cultural Security, ed. 
Yasushi Watanabe (United Kingdom: Edward Elgar Publishing, May 2018), 167-184; 
“Statelessness: An Analytical Framework for Prevention, Reduction, and Protection,” 
United Nations Refugee Agency, accessed October 21, 2020, 
https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/statelessness/49a271752/statelessness-
analytical-framework-prevention-reduction-protection.html. 
104 Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship. Markets, Statelessness, and the Right 
to Have Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 118-120. 
105 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statelessness and Citizenship in the 
East African Community, September 2018, 47-58, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bee966d4.html.  
106 Margaret R. Somers, Genealogies of Citizenship. Markets, Statelessness, and the Right 
to Have Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 143. 
107 For example, Kurdish minority that inhabits an area between Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and 
Syria.  
108 “Rohingya Crisis in Myanmar,” Council on Foreign Relations, last modified October 
21, 2020, https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/rohingya-crisis-
myanmar; Eleanor Albert, Lindsay Maizland, “The Rohingya Crisis,” Council on 
Foreign Relations, last modified January 23, 2020, 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/rohingya-crisis; “The Struggle of the Rohingya: 
Escape From Myanmar,” video documentary filmed by VICE News, 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
27 
 
https://video.vice.com/en_us/video/the-struggle-of-the-rohingya-escape-from-
myanmar/56b9b31a204fa2715a41def5. 
109 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Statelessness and Citizenship in the 
East African Community, September 2018, 47-58, 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/5bee966d4.html; Mike Sanderson, “Statelessness and 
Mass Expulsion in Sudan: A Reassessment of the International Law,” Northwestern 
Journal of International Human Rights 12, no. 1 (2014): 74-114, 
https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/njihr/vol12/iss1/4; “A Study of 
Statelessness in South Sudan,” United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, May 
29, 2018, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/63857; Lindsey N. Kingston, 
“Bringing Rwandan Refugees Home: The Cessation Clause, Statelessness, and Forced 
Repatriation,” International Journal of Refugee Law 29, no. 3 (October 2017): 417-
437, https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eex030; Zahra Albarazi, Thomas McGee, 
“Statelessness Among Syria’s Displaced: Still Unidentified,” European Network on 
Statelessness, February 27, 2020, https://www.statelessness.eu/blog/statelessness-
among-syria-s-displaced-still-unidentified. 
110 Jane Mcadam, Climate Change, Forced Migration, and International Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 15-24; International Organization for Migration, 
Migration and Climate Change Report No. 31, April 2008, 11-20, 
https://publications.iom.int/books/mrs-ndeg31-migration-and-climate-change. 
111 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. 
Summary for Policymakers, May 27, 2020, 2-6, https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/. 
112 “Refugees,” United Nations Global Issues, accessed June 5, 2020, 
https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/refugees/. 
113 Malcolm Webb, “The Orphans of Mali’s Violence,” Al Jazeera, June 22, 2019, 
https://www.aljazeera.com/videos/2019/06/22/the-orphans-of-malis-violence/; 
“Water Conflict,” Pacific Institute, accessed October 21, 2020, 
http://www.worldwater.org/conflict/list/; Elaisha Stokes, “The Drought That 
Preceeded Syria’s Civil War Was Likely Worst in 900 Years,” VICE News, March 3, 
2016, https://www.vice.com/en/article/3kw77v/the-drought-that-preceded-syrias-
civil-war-was-likely-the-worst-in-900-years; David Wallace-Wells, The Uninhabitable 
Earth: Life After Warming (New York: Tim Dougan Books, 2019), 124.  
114 Claire Casey, David Rothkopf, “Impacts of Climate Change, Resource Scarcity, and 
Foreign Policy,” World Wildlife Magazine, Winter 2014, 
https://www.worldwildlife.org/magazine/issues/winter-2014/articles/impacts-of-
climate-change-resource-scarcity-and-foreign-policy; “How Earth’s Geography Will 
Change With Climate Change,” Kurzgesagt, posted May 19, 2020, video, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZfFvLJyPf3o.  
115 Becky Little, “7 Cultural Sites Damaged or Destroyed by War,” History, January 9, 
2020, https://www.history.com/news/cultural-sites-heritage-wars. 
116 United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, Case Studies on 
Climate Change and World Heritage Report, June 2007, 67-74, 
https://whc.unesco.org/en/activities/473/.  
117 U.S. Global Change Research Program, The Climate Report. The National Climate 
Assessment – Impacts, Risks, and Adaptation in the United States (Brooklyn: Melville 
House, 2019), 12-15.  
118 Melissa Fleming, “Climate Change Could Become the Biggest Driver of Displacement: 
UNHCR Chief,” United Nations Refugee Agency, December 16, 2009, 
https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2009/12/4b2910239/climate-change-become-
biggest-driver-displacement-unhcr-chief.html.  
119 Anatol Lieven, Climate Change and the Nation State. The Case for Nationalism in a 
Warming World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2020), 69. 
120 Anatol Lieven, Climate Change and the Nation State, 35.  
121 “Ending Statelessness in Europe is Realistic Goal by 2024,” UN News, June 1, 2015, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/06/500382-ending-statelessness-europe-realistic-
goal-2024-un-refugee-agency-says. 
Krupocin and Krupocin: The Impact of Climate Change on Cultural Security
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2020
28 
 
122 Navin Singh Khadka, “Refugees at Increased Risk from Extreme Weather,” BBC News, 
December 10, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-50692857. 
123 “UN Emissions Report: World on Course for More than 3 Degree Spike, Even if 
Climate Commitments Are Met,” UN News, November 26, 2019, 
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/11/1052171. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 13, No. 4
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol13/iss4/2
DOI: https://doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.13.4.1847
